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ABSTRACT 
 
The Nuclear Reactor Safety (NRS) has been established since the discovery of nuclear fission, and the 
occurrence of accidents in Nuclear Power Plants worldwide has contributed for its improvement. The Final 
Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) must contain complete information concerning safety of the plant and plant site, 
and must be seen as a compendium of NRS. The FSAR integrates both the licensing requirements and the 
analytical techniques. The analytical techniques can be applied by using a realistic approach, addressing the 
uncertainties of the results. This work aims to show an overview of the main analytical techniques that can be 
applied with a Best Estimated Plus Uncertainty (BEPU) methodology, which is „the best one can do‟, as well as 
the ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) principle. Moreover, the paper intends to demonstrate the 
background of the licensing process through the main licensing requirements. 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Nuclear Reactor Safety (NRS) is the set of materials, components, structures, procedures and 
numerical tools used to minimize the risk of contamination of humans and environment by 
radioactive material. NRS has been established for several decades, since the discovery of 
nuclear fission.  Since that time, any installation involving the use of radioactive material has 
been designed according to safety requirements [1]. 
 
Nuclear safety has become a technology following extraordinary industrial investments since 
the 50‟s. A step impulse to the technology came when powerful computers were available at 
the beginning of the 80‟s [1]. Events in the last decades occurring in the Three Mile Island 
Unit-2, Chernobyl Unit-4 and Fukushima Units1-3 have challenged the sustainability of 
nuclear technology and undermined the trust of the public, of the decision makers and even of 
the scientific community toward nuclear safety. Efforts have been completed by the 
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technological community following each of the disasters and ended-up in reinforcements of 
the Engineered Safety Features (ESF) and of Safety Barriers [2]. 
 
The NRS technology consists of two components – the Fundamentals and the Application – 
as demonstrated in Figure 1. The first component includes the key safety objective, the 
related safety principles, and safety requirements developed by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA). The Application refers to the application of those principles and 
requirements for the design, licensing, construction, operation and decommissioning of any 
nuclear installation [2]. 
 
Figure 1: Simplified sketch for Nuclear Reactor Safety Technology. 
 
The accomplishment of safety fundamentals in the Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) design is 
achievable by suitable safety analysis and assessment. The safety evaluation of the NPP is 
based on the fulfillment of a set of design acceptance criteria such as maximum peak 
cladding temperature, maximum pressure in the primary system, among others, to be met 
under a wide range of plant operating conditions to confirm the preservation of physical 
barriers [3]. The acceptance criteria are normally defined by the national regulator, and a 
comprehensive Safety Analysis Report (SAR) for individual NPP provides the demonstration 
that the safety objective is met and, noticeably, that acceptable safety margins exists [2]. 
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The SAR shall be seen as the compendium of information concerning the safety of the 
specific NPP and includes the demonstration of acceptability of the NPP against the rules and 
related criteria established for the Country. The Safety Analysis is part of the licensing 
process and is documented in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) [2]. 
 
In all countries using nuclear energy for power production, safety analysis has to be 
performed and documented in the FSAR, as well as all the important characteristics of the 
plant, which is reviewed and/or approved by the national regulator. The FSAR should have a 
predefined structure and content and approved procedures and methodologies, brought out by 
the regulator by requirements in the form of guides, rules and recommendations [3]. 
 
The safety analysis tools are broadly used within the framework of the design of new plants 
and operation of existing plants, including licensing of new NPP projects, periodic safety 
reviews, development of new emergency operating procedures, analysis of operational 
events, among others. Significantly, increased capacities of new computation technology 
made it possible to switch over to the new generation of computer codes, with the use of best 
estimate codes with treatment of uncertainties, and coupling of computer codes [3]. 
 
The survey conducted between 1989-1995 on the evaluation methods of uncertainty led to the 
development and use of Best Estimated Plus Uncertainty (BEPU) for licensing. Initially 
BEPU methods were applied mainly to large Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). However, 
later it started to be applied for small LOCA, as well as to operational transients [4]. 
 
Nowadays, in most countries the national regulators allow the use of best-estimate codes to 
be applied in the licensing process. Some examples of such countries are United States (US), 
France, Brazil and Argentina. The US Westinghouse developed and licensed a best-estimate 
Large-Break Loss of Coolant Accident (LB-LOCA) methodology for three and four-loop 
designs in 1996 and, later, extended the methodology to two-loop upper plenum injection 
plants [5].  
 
In France, an accident analysis method was developed based on the use of realistic computer 
codes called Deterministic Realistic Method (DRM), found on qualification of the calculation 
uncertainty, which is taken into account deterministically when the results are compared to 
the acceptance criteria  The DRM was first applied in 1997 to LB-LOCA for a French three-
loop pressurized water reactor [6].  
 
In Brazil, the uncertainty calculation for Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident (SB-LOCA) 
scenario in Angra-1 NPP was an exercise for the application of an uncertainty methodology. 
For Angra-2 a LB-LOCA analysis was performed and the treatment of uncertainties was 
carried out separately in three basic categories: code uncertainty (statistical quantification of 
the difference between calculated and measured parameters); plant parameters uncertainties 
(statistical variations); and fuel uncertainty parameters (statistical variations) [7] [8]. 
 
For the licensing process of the Atucha-II NPP in Argentina, the BEPU approach was selected 
and applied to the Chapter 15 of FSAR, “Transient and Accident Analysis” in 2008 [9]. Thus, 
the BEPU methodology has been adopted covering the established spectrum of Postulated 
Initial Events (PIE), wherein procedures have been applied to identify the list of PIE and 
applicable acceptance criteria, and the application of computational tools produced results 
related to the Atucha II transient scenarios originated by the PIE [9]. 
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The objective of the present paper is to discuss one entire FSAR based on the BEPU 
methodology. For this purpose, an overview of the analytical techniques needed in a generic 
FSAR that can be applied with a BEPU methodology, which is „the best one can do‟, as well 
as the ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) principle will be presented. Furthermore, 
the paper intends to show a background of the licensing process through the main licensing 
requirements, as well as the key topics and disciplines in licensing documented on FSAR.   
 
 
2. LICENSING 
 
The licensing is the process that guides the life of the NPP from the conceptual design to the 
decommissioning. The licensing objective is to demonstrate the capability of safety systems 
to maintain fundamental safety functions. The complete licensing process is supported by the 
IAEA General Nuclear Safety Objective, which is “to protect individuals, society and the 
environment from harm by establishing and maintaining in nuclear installations effective 
defenses against radiological hazards” [10]. 
 
The licensing process is constituted by NRS technology, imposed by a regulatory authority. 
The process follows specification and rules that are typically part of the laws of the Country 
where the NPP is supposed to operate or where it is designed [2]. 
 
The legal aspects and the public acceptance of nuclear installations are primarily concerned 
within the licensing process. The licensing process creates a contest between two main actors: 
the licensor and the licensee where the licensor is a government institution also identified as 
regulatory authority, and the licensee is any company owning or managing a nuclear 
installation. The licensing is a life process for any nuclear installation: licensing must follow 
innovations and findings from the safety technology [1]. 
2.1. Licensing Requirements 
 
For the operating of a commercial nuclear power plant in the United States, and in all the 
countries with NPP operated by Westinghouse, a license from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) is necessary. Among other things, the NRC is responsible for licensing 
and regulating the operation of NPPs [11].  
 
Requirements for obtaining an operating license are observed in the NRC‟s regulations, 
which prescribe a two-step process involving issuance of a construction permit and an 
operating license, according to the 10 Code Federal Regulation Part 50 (10 CFR 50) [12]. An 
application for a construction permit must contain three types of information: (1) preliminary 
safety analyses, (2) an environmental review, and (3) financial and antitrust statements. 
Operating License Final design information and plans for operation are developed during the 
construction of the nuclear plant. The applicant then submits an application to the NRC for an 
operating license. The application contains a Final Safety Analysis Report and an updated 
environmental report. The Safety Analysis Report, as mentioned before, describes the final 
design of the plant, the safety evaluation, the operational limits, and the anticipated response 
of the plant to postulated accidents, and the plans for coping with emergencies [11]. 
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In 1989, the NRC established new alternatives for nuclear plant licensing under 10 CFR Part 
52, which describes a combined licensing process, an early site permit process, and a 
standard plant design certification process. An application for a combined license may 
incorporate by reference a standard design certification, an early site permit, both, or neither 
[11]. 
 
On the one hand the set of Code Federal Regulations are requirements binding on all persons 
and organizations who receive a license from NRC to use nuclear materials or to operate 
nuclear facilities and on the other hand there are Regulatory Guides and NUREGs, which 
play an important role in dealing with recommendations of construction and operation of 
NPP. 
 
The Regulatory Guides are organized into divisions, which include: Power Reactors (1); 
Research and Test Reactors (2); Fuels and Materials Facilities (3); Environmental and Siting 
(4); Materials and Plant Protection (5); Products (6); Transportation (7); Occupational Health 
(8); Antitrust and Financial Review (9); and General (10). The Regulatory Guide 1.206 - 
Combined License Applications for Nuclear Power Plants (Light Water Reactor Edition) [13] 
deals with the content of the FSAR and the information is reflected in the NUREG-0800 [14], 
which, in turn, is guidance to NRC staff in performing safety reviews. Both documents 
contain a description of the content of the 19 chapters of the FSAR. 
 
2.2. Analytical Techniques 
 
Analytical techniques dealing with NPP are the set of methodologies, code computers and 
approaches to development analysis that ensure the reach of the acceptance criteria and 
consequently ensure the integrity of barriers to the release of radioactive materials. These 
analytical techniques are applied to the safety analyses and are documented in the FSAR to 
demonstrate that the plant is safe.  
 
The safety analyses were initially conservative –  the Option 1 in Table 1 – , which is often 
called Appendix K (of 10 CFR 50), in the case of LOCA.  Then after, best-estimated codes 
have been developed –  the Options 2 and 3 emerged –  depending on whether only 
conservative inputs are adopted or a full uncertainty evaluation is being performed (BEPU), 
respectively. However, it is possible, in principle, to provide a level of flexibility by using 
probabilistic arguments to take credit for the probability that a system, which was 
deterministically excluded in Options 1 to 3, is actually available, consisting in Option 4. 
However, this Option is not yet a part of current licensing practices. This option is connected 
to future developments in risk informed regulations [2]. Table 1 shows those Options.  
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Table 1:  Options for combination of a computer code and input data. 
 
Option Computer code Availability of systems Initial and boundary 
Conditions 
1. Conservative Conservative Conservative assumptions Conservative input data 
2. Combined  Best estimate Conservative assumptions Conservative input data 
 
3.Best Estimate 
(Best Estimate Plus 
Uncertainties 
BEPU) 
Best estimate Conservative assumptions Realistic plus uncertainty; 
partly most unfavourable 
conditions
 
4. Risk informed 
(Extended BEPU) 
Best estimate Derived from probabilistic 
safety analysis 
Realistic input data with 
uncertainties
 
 
 
There is variety of codes that allows predicting the response of the NPPs during accident 
conditions. In the last decades, several complex system codes have been developed with 
proven capabilities for simulating the main thermo-hydraulic process that occurs during 
transient conditions. Originally, system thermal-hydraulic codes were used to support the 
design of safety systems, but since the publication of the 10 CFR 50.46, in 1978, they start to 
be applied widely in the licensing process. In parallel, especially after the TMI-2 accident, 
several realistic or so-called ”Best-Estimate” (BE) codes started being developed in order to 
switch from the previously-used conservative assumptions to more realistic description of the 
processes. Since then, BE system codes are used to perform safety analysis of the NPP during 
accident scenarios, uncertainty quantification, Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA), reactor 
design, among others. Some examples of BE codes are RELAP5, TRAC, TRACE, 
CATHARE, and ATHLET. [15]. 
 
The term Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) has been in use since the issue of the 
WASH-700 (subsequently WASH-1400) in the early 70‟s [16]. Three PSA levels are 
distinguished to estimate the risk. Those levels cover the probability and the consequences 
(i.e. the radiological impact) of faulting events at any time of the NPP life. Noticeably, the 
calculation of consequences can only be performed by using Deterministic Safety 
Assessment (DSA) tools [1]. 
 
The term DSA is associated with the availability of qualified BE computational tools or 
codes, and it has been in use since the 90‟s. However, conservative DSA constitutes key 
practice for the design and the safety confirmation of existing reactors. On the other hand, 
uncertainty is the key-word for the application of BE codes. Both DSA and PSA are needed 
for the issue of a consistent Safety Analysis Report (i.e. primarily chapters 19 and 15 of the 
generally accepted FSAR structure). Furthermore, a variety of interactions are envisaged and 
do exists between the two NST categories. [1] 
 
The Risk Informed (regulation) framework or concept was spread into the international 
nuclear safety community since the „90‟s: the idea is that the relevance of any action or any 
component or structure connected with the NPP, including the numerical analyses, shall be 
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evaluated based on its impact upon the safety (or risk). Recently a more robust architecture 
for the same idea has been formulated. [1] 
 
Figure 2 shows the pyramid of licensing competence. As discussed before, the result of a 
licensing process is the Safety Analysis Report approved and at the bases of the process there 
are laws, i.e. CFR in the case of US. In-between the bottom and the top there are subjects like 
Risk Informed Concept, PSA and DSA, Option 3/Option4, and BEPU, already mentioned in 
the present document, but that will be explained in more detail in the next section [1]. 
 
 
Figure 2: The pyramid of competence and the licensing process. 
 
During the last decade, attempts were made to integrate DSA and PSA based on the 
organization of devoted workshops open to specialists in both areas. This is interpreted as the 
top (or the tip) of the pyramid of competence in the joint area of DSA and PSA. The so-called 
IAEA „Option 3‟ or „Option 4‟ for performing accident analysis may constitute the 
framework or can provide the bases for the integration between PSA and DSA [1]. 
 
3. BEPU 
 
BEPU approach (Option 3 shown in Table 1) is characterized by applying the BE code with 
BE initial and boundary conditions to simulate the intended event. When performing the 
licensing calculations it is expected that the availability of safety and control components and 
systems be defined in a conservative way, including the assumption of the single failure and 
loss of off-site power. However, uncertainty of the best estimate calculation has to be 
quantified and considered when comparing the calculated results with the applicable 
acceptance criteria [3]. 
 
 
There are several methods for the BEPU application and all of them have the identification 
and characterization of the relevant uncertainty parameters in common as well as the 
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quantification of the global influence of the combination of these uncertainties on calculated 
results [3]. 
 
BE analysis with evaluation of uncertainties is the only way to quantify the existing safety 
margins. Uncertainty quantification has been used mainly in two different areas, generally 
aiming at investigating of the effect of various input uncertainties on the results calculated 
with complex thermo-hydraulic codes, and of performing uncertainty analyses for licensing 
purposes [17].  
 
4. BEPU-FSAR 
 
BEPU approach includes the use of the most recent analytical techniques, the existence of 
validated computational tools, and the characterization of expected errors or the evaluation of 
uncertainty affecting the results of application.  
 
As defined in Title 10, Section 20.1003, of the Code of Federal Regulations [18] ALARA  
means making every reasonable effort to maintain exposures to ionizing radiation as far 
below the dose limits as practical, consistent with the purpose for which the licensed activity 
is undertaken, taking into account the state of technology, the economics of improvements in 
relation to state of technology, the economics of improvements in relation to benefits to the 
public health and safety, and other societal and socioeconomic considerations, and in relation 
to utilization of nuclear energy and licensed materials in the public interest.  
The ALARA principle shall be taken at the origin of BEPU: the as Low as Reasonably 
Achievable shall be translated into as Accurate as Reasonably Achievable in the case of 
BEPU [2], and this relation should be the starting point to development of a BEPU-FSAR. 
To perform a BEPU-FSAR a homogenization of the analyses is proposed, including 
calculation processes, that are not limited to accident analysis but cover selected topics that 
are connected with the design and the operation of the NPP. 
Due to historical reasons, an accident analysis received considerable attention from the side 
of NRS actors. However, a sort of accidents can happen in either peripheral areas or 
following precursory events which may bring the NPP in conditions outside those considered 
for accident analysis. It may be easily observed by the root-causes of the major nuclear 
accidents, like Fukushima. Therefore, the homogenization of NRS topics is required: it 
implies systematic identification of topics and their consideration for the analysis [2]. 
Key disciplines and key topics have been defined by areas of knowledge based on the FSAR 
chapters, the Regulatory Guide divisions, and the IAEA Safety Standard Series. The list of 
key disciplines and related key topics that was derived from the FSAR content is provided in 
Table 2. 
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Table 2: Key disciplines and Key topics in the licensing process of a NPP. 
 
Key Disciplines Key Topics 
Legal Licensing Structure  
 
FSAR writing and assessment  
Knowledge of, IAEA, US NRC, ASME, ANS, IEEE 
frameworks of requirements  
Defense in Depth application 
Siting & Environmental 
Climatology  
Seismology  
Earthquake and Tsunami  
Geology including stability of slopes 
Hydrology and Floods  
Meteorology  
Catastrophic (including natural and man-originated) 
events  
Atmospheric diffusion 
Loadings 
Population Distribution 
 
Mechanical Engineering: Design of Structures, 
Systems and Components 
 
Structural Mechanics   
Thermodynamic Machinery  
Control Rod mechanisms 
 
Nuclear Fuel  
 
Nuclear Fuel performance  
Fuel movement 
 
       Materials  
 
Corrosion  
Mechanical resistance 
Radiation damage 
Creep Analysis 
Fatigue Analysis 
Erosion 
 
Neutron Physics 
Cross Section Derivation  
Monte Carlo 
Chemical Engineering 
Chemistry of nuclear fluids 
Chemistry of water 
Metal Steam production 
Zircaloy reactions 
Boron control 
 
 
Electronic Engineering 
Instrumentation and Control (l & C)  
Nuclear Instrumentation (in-core)  
Ex-core instrumentation 
Digital systems 
Analog systems 
Electrical Engineering 
Transformers 
Alternators 
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 Table 2: Key disciplines and Key topics in the licensing process of a NPP - 
Continuation 
 
Key Disciplines Key Topics 
Civil Engineering 
Containment 
Foundation 
Deterministic Safety Analysis 
Accident Analysis 
Computational tools 
Uncertainty Analysis  
Severe Accident Consequences  
 
Probabilistic Safety Analysis 
Reliability 
Cost-Benefit Analysis  
Severe Accident Probability  
Probability of Meteorite 
 
Human Factors Engineering 
Man-Machine interface  
Simulator   
Human failure  
Occupational Health and Radioprotection 
Radiological Protection  
Accessibility to remote Radioactive Zones  
Shielding  
Physical Security 
Fire protection 
Hazards 
Plant Operation and Procedures 
Emergency Preparedness  
Emergency Operating Procedures  
Plant procedures for normal operation 
In-service Inspection  
Administrative Procedures 
Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance 
Criteria 
Quality Assurance
1
 
Management 
Procedures 
Standards  
Computational Science
1
 
Information Technology 
Software 
1
  Cross Cutting Disciplines, which are presented throughout the FSAR. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The application of BEPU methods were carried out in several countries; however, the 
framework to introduce the BE analysis, as well as BEPU methodology, into the licensing 
process is still an open issue. Notwithstanding over the years more and more applications 
have proven to be satisfactory, since BE analysis with the evaluation of uncertainties is the 
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only way to quantify existing safety margins, even uncertainty evaluations being considered 
as a need to improve practicability of methods. 
Some problems can be associated and addressed within the historical licensing process as 
high cost, reluctance to innovation and lack of homogeneity. Nowadays, the licensing process 
is based on a non-homogeneous interpretation of licensing requirements, engaging different 
groups of experts without coordination, resulting in a lack of homogeneity. Assembling the 
top level competence in relation to each of the listed topics and disciplines, on the one hand 
there is an obligation and importance to demonstrate the safety of any nuclear installation and 
on the other hand there is the difficulty to address the safety in a holistic way. The proposal 
of a BEPU-FSAR, or a whole FSAR based on the application of BEPU methodology, is to fill 
this lack by providing the homogenization of analytical techniques and thus to increase the 
safety of the plant.  
Through the key topics and disciplines of licensing showed in the Table 2, we can recognize 
some areas which need expertise knowledge (e.g. Climatology, Instrumentation and Control). 
The future steps of this work will concentrate on propagation of this expertise into the 
remaining areas thus building a BEPU-FSAR in the most gradual and integrated manner, 
adding new knowledge and improving plant safety. 
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